Canadians have only a few more days to make a written submission about their experiences, observations, and ideas on the matter of foreign interference in Canada’s federal electoral processes and democratic institutions. All submissions received by August 12, 2024, will be read and considered by the Commission, but there are some important things the Commission wants the public to know.
The Commission may refer or quote a submission either in a written report or during the Commission’s public hearings, but no identifying information about the person who made the submission will be released. Or, if a person does not want their submission referenced to or quoted, then they can mark their submission as “confidential”. For those interested in writing to the Commission, it is recommended that submissions are specific about the facts related to their experiences, focusing on important things they want the Commission to know.
A general outline to follow suggested by the Commission includes writing about: “Who are you?”, “How have you been involved with Canadian federal elections or democratic processes?”, “What do you know about foreign interference in federal elections or democratic processes?”, “How have you been affected by foreign interference in Canadian federal elections or democratic processes?”, “How have you responded or reacted to foreign interference?”, “What else would you like the Commission to know or consider?”
On the Commission’s webpage, the section for “Submissions by Individuals”, provides more context regarding those questions, such as how a person became aware of foreign interference (personal or otherwise); if a person sought out assistance from law enforcement or government departments, services, agencies, or independent federal organizations related to foreign interference; how effective that assistance was (if at all); what a person thinks would have helped them; and any other suggestions or recommendations relating to detecting, deterring or combatting foreign interference and for protecting or supporting people who may be vulnerable to foreign interference. Submissions can be made to the Commission via email, mail, or via the Signal encrypted messaging app, and should be made before August 12, 2024, due to the timing of Stage 2 hearings. For more information on the Commission’s work to date and to learn more about the upcoming Stage 2, visit the Foreign Interference Commission.
Covering the Foreign Interference Commission, but also writing to the Commission.
Back in February, 2024, I wrote a two-page summary to the Commission after there was a similar call for submissions from the public. What I did back then, was to detail how I reported political interference back in 2021, initially reporting it to the Ottawa Police Service before having to escalate it to the highest level of government. The only way to describe it is a policing and public safety failing of epic proportions—from the municipal level to the federal level, but also a failing of key stakeholders outside of government.
In that two-page letter, I highlighted how the same individuals who had exploited members of my ethnic community with an illegal online gambling platform had also attempted to organize political fundraisers and “rub shoulders” with key Members of Parliament (individual(s) and party(s) won’t be named), and my connection to everyone involved. That letter also detailed how I reached out to a principal agent(s), individuals responsible for managing their party’s compliance with the financial reporting and regulatory requirements set by Elections Canada, after policing and public safety stakeholders had not done so themselves.
I also highlighted my personal community involvement, both to the Ottawa community at-large, but also within my own ethnic community. Then I described how policing powers were ultimately weaponized against me with two frivolous general occurrence reports being filed. These frivolous reports occurred right after the Ontario Civilian Policing Commission finished a review into how my complaint related to the illegal online gambling platform had been handled. These frivolous reports were also occurring at the same time I was interviewing for a civilian role in the RCMP.
Similar claims about the weaponizing of democratic institutions, like policing and the courts, have also been echoed by members of different diasporas across Canada during Stage 1 of the Foreign Interference Commission, but even by reporters too. Then there was also reporting on how different levels of policing and public safety have been exploited by hostile state actors and organized criminal figures. Perhaps it is part of why different ethnic communities have remained quiet about the abuses they have been enduring. It may also help answer why other ethnic communities are unlikely to come forward after getting exploited by hostile state actors or criminal actors, no matter what how badly they are brutalized.
Sam Cooper’s reporting on how hostile state actors and their associates have attempted to weaponize the institutions of policing, lawyers, and even the courts or how two Canadians with links to organized criminal groups were paid by a hostile state actor to carry out a contracted killing of an Iranian-American we can see that foreign interreference is giving us more than we bargained for. Hopefully the Commission does not overlook the importance of exploring how interconnected the foreign interference is with domestic interference and complex crimes, and that much of those threats are manifesting at municipal levels, slowly working their way up to provincial levels, before they reach the federal level.
Much of the information that has come out about national security breakdowns since Stage 1 of the Foreign Interference Commission brings me back to a suggestion that was referenced in the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) Special Report on Federal Policing. In that special report, the defence attorney, jointly selected by the RCMP Commissioner and Director of CSIS to carry out a study on operational improvements, Anil Kapoor, suggests that it might be time to “accept that a criminal prosecution is not the ‘gold standard’ in national security investigations”. What makes this suggestion rather questionable to me is that a person does not have to carry out an attack for them to be prosecuted criminally, as the Criminal Code accounts for conspiring to carry out an attack, with “conspiracy to” charges.
All the breakdowns related to national security have resulted in US officials criticizing Canada’s laws and its ability to pursue criminal matters related to national security. The same suggestions about federal policing and national security matters requiring a shift from criminal prosecutions being seen as the “gold standard”, would not be accepted or tolerated by US lawmakers in the United States Congress. Someone that wants to threaten the Canadian way of life, I feel those situations should be handled how the US handles when the American way of life is threatened, by sending alphabet agencies to bring a world of trouble to anyone that attempts to threaten that way of life and by making sure they serve out multiple life sentences, in the super-est of super max prisons. Any other approach to federal policing and national security matters would be Canada being soft on public safety-related matters.
When I eventually end up writing to the Commission for stage 2, I intend to re-highlight the importance of exploring the interconnected nature of foreign interference, domestic interference, and complex crime, expanding on recent developments and the limitations of current processes and public policies.
More university-style academic reporting is required for Stage 2.
What the Foreign Interference Commission needs is more academically oriented reporting that focuses on detailing the inquiry across different schools of thought, despite it not being as “sexy” as the click-bait pieces in the news that disregard everything to lay blame. Having already done an academic overview of public inquiries with “Bringing RICO Laws to Canada – Public Inquiries Can Be Better”, one thing that becomes clear about public inquiries is that the more you learn about them the less clear things are. None of what I learned during my academic analysis of public inquiries for the “Bringing RICO Laws to Canada” series would have been found in any of the reporting on any of Canada’s public inquiries, and what I learned even countered some reporting of old.
What stood out the most from that analysis was what the Honourable Justice Jean Alphonse Decary (1934-2021) opined regarding the 1997 Public Inquiry on the Blood System. The Honourable Justice Decary, who was one of the presiding Justices over the 1997 public inquiry, wrote for the Court about whether a Commissioner could ever make a finding of criminal or civil liability, saying that the matter was to be left open and to remain undetermined, but that the Commissioner in the 1997 case would not be allowed to do so because of what they stated previously about their scope not being criminal or civil. And that might be the single-most important legal opinion on public inquiries, because of what was left undetermined.
One of the major drivers behind me wanting to cover the Foreign Interference Commission stemmed from wanting to understand the proceedings from an academic place of interest, experiencing the events in-person, and not wanting to learn about it through intermediaries where the reporting focus laid elsewhere. It stemmed from the earliest reporting around the Foreign Interference Commission being rather fluffy, with little being discussed in relation to how the Foreign Interference Commission’s scope and mandate might or might not impact its ability to adequately analyze the issue of foreign interference and everything it may entail.
For instance, there were no questions being asked about the Commission’s definition for “foreign interference”, as it related to the public inquiry or whether that definition would account for any dynamic and interconnected threats that were discovered during the inquiry related to foreign interference. There were no questions being asked that attempted to expand on the Commission’s mandate, like what might fall under “The Commission will also examine and assess the capacity of relevant federal departments, agencies, institutional structures and governance processes to permit the Government of Canada to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada’s democratic processes.” Nor were there any questions that addressed how the Commission might consider reallocating resources to explore newly discovered matters that intersected with the foreign interference.
My earliest questions for the Commission focused on the dynamic and interconnected nature of foreign interference and domestic interference, and complex crimes. Since then, much of the reporting on foreign interference has indicated that foreign interreference intersects with the dynamic threats of domestic interference and complex crimes. That reporting makes understanding the questions above that much more important, because of how foreign interference is giving us more than we bargained for.
The Foreign Interference Commission has already bettered Canada’s trajectory, addressing much of the threats identified in the RCMPs, “Whole-of-Government Five-Year Trends for Canada”, and it will do even more by the time it concludes and issues its final report. In addition to covering the proceedings of Stage 2 of the Foreign Interference Commission this Fall, I will be detailing what Canada’s closest economic and security partners, including G7 countries as well as New Zealand and Australia, have shared with me about how they are safeguarding their democratic institutions against foreign interference and organized criminal activities. But the grandest thinking around this challenge may be occurring just south of the Canadian border, with a public policy approach that few could have imagined would ever come into existence, which has the potential to change everything, and that I will be exploring more in future.