Prime targets for foreign interference are the same for all of Canada’s economic and security partners and they include political systems, military capabilities, trade and economic interests, intellectual property, community safety, and democratic freedoms, which is carried out by pressuring and manipulating governments, businesses, decision-makers, and communities. So we continue this series by looking at the issue of foreign interference from the points of view of Germany, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia. How different partners go about in addressing threats may be similar, but nuances do exist and they are rooted in government traditions, government transparency, and “prohibition”-style thinking.
From a German point of view.
Germany was one of the first countries to take measures to insulate its institutions and democratic processes after seeing what transpired during the U.S. Presidential Election in 2016. This included cyber defence initiatives (Bundeswehr Cyber and Information Space Command, 2017), network enforcement of removing disinformation and hate speech in tight timeframes (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, 2017), and by taking a leadership role in shaping the EU’s broader strategy to combat foreign interference with disinformation monitoring and coordinating hybrid threat responses (via the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats).
Germany’s approach to countering hybrid threats, including foreign interference, is centered around core departments coordinating closely together. These departments include the Federal Foreign Office (AA), the Federal Ministry of Interior and Community (BMI), the German Chancellery, the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Press Office. The AA and the Federal Press Office are involved with leading the Expert Group on Disinformation, which brings together experts from those key institutions. The BMI’s role is best understood as that of a coordinator that handles hybrid threats, and it has established the Hybrid Working Group (AG Hybrid).
The AG Hybrid is a part of broader efforts to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation, cyberattacks, and other tactics that blend military and non-military actions. The AG Hybrid is responsible for coordinating between government agencies, security services, and international partners to ensure that all stakeholders are prepared to handle any threats that may arise, including those to critical infrastructure, digital spaces, and other foreign influence operations.
On the topic of digital platform operators (like META, X, etc.), Germany was among the first to take the position that digital platform operators have a responsibility to take action against the spread of disinformation, and regulations have been passed as part of the Digital Services Act. Germany also joined with other EU member states in voting for the Artificial Intelligence Act, which aims to ensure that AI systems used in the EU are safe, transparent, comprehensible, non-discriminatory, and environmentally friendly. The goal behind the legislation is to safeguard fundamental rights, democracy, the rule of law, and environmental sustainability, and to account for the potential risks of AI and the level of their impact.
From a U.K. point of view.
The U.K. has been quite active in their efforts to counter foreign interference, and it continues to have a similar level of cooperation with EU partners even after Brexit. Much of the legislative advancements on things like artificial intelligence still involve close collaboration and cooperation, but the U.K. also has more autonomy over how it implements different legislation.
In 2023, the U.K. introduced the National Security Act 2023, to provide security services and law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to deter, detect, and disrupt modern-day state threats. Compared to other countries, this Act stands out for the introduction of a foreign influence registry, expanding the definition of espionage laws to account for cyber and economic espionage as well as disinformation, and includes tough penalties for individuals involved in espionage, sabotage, or foreign interference activities even up to life imprisonment for the most serious offences. It also focuses on hybrid threats and non-military cover actions, a more holistic view of national security, accounting for the hybrid threats posed by cyber-attacks, disinformation, and the manipulation of public opinion. National Security Act 2023 also provides for more enhanced investigative and preventative powers for policing and public safety stakeholders. There are also measures that focus on hostile state actors who attempt to coerce and interfere with the U.K.’s democratic processes, which is why it has been described as one of the most forward-thinking national security laws found anywhere in the world.
In 2023, the U.K. also introduced the Online Safety Act 2023, aimed at protecting both children and adults that go on the internet by making social media companies and search engines more responsible for user safety, as well as a range of websites, apps, and other services (social media, file cloud storage and sharing sites, video sharing platforms, online forums, dating services, online instant messaging services). These platforms are now required to specify in their terms of service as to what the exact measures they use to prevent underage access, which has led to the adoption of age assurance technologies that can check a user’s age. Additionally, the Act allows adult users to have a greater control over the kinds of content they see and who they engage with online, including the option of filtering out unverified users.
Should these companies fail to adhere to the standards set out in the Act, they can be fined up to £18 million pounds or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater, and senior managers can be criminally liable in some circumstances. Additionally, in the most extreme of cases, with the agreement of the courts, payment providers, advertisers and internet service providers can be directed to stop working with different platforms and assisting them with generating money or being accessed from the U.K. The Act does distinguish between digital platforms and the demands placed on them, proportionate to their size and capacity. But specific safety measures still need to be established and there is the use of unclear threshold words like “extreme”, to distinguish between the different kinds of (extreme) pornography and (extreme) sexual violence.
One thing to keep on eye on as it relates to foreign interference and artificial intelligence is that that the King’s Speech (2024) emphasized that the Government would look to introduce legislation to address those who worked to develop powerful technologies, and that a consultation on this is expected to commence in the coming months.
From a New Zealand point of view.
New Zealand’s approach to foreign interference is similar to how Italy approaches the matter, given how the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) has a role in managing national security risks and coordinating activity across government. Despite the similarities, New Zealand also incorporates more of a multi-sector approach to managing threats, where government takes greater responsibility in assisting different sectors with the necessary support to better protect those risks. Although many responsibilities related to foreign interference tend to intersect and are shared between agencies and departments, specific agencies and departments also have more specific priorities that are related to their functions, like the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) ensuring the resilience of research and science funding proposals to interference.
In 2023, New Zealand published a first-of-its-kind report, a “threatscape” report that provided a comprehensive assessment on the threats of violent extremism, foreign interference, and espionage. What made the report a first was the decision to than had previously been reported at an unclassified level by the NZSIS, and it also outlines how New Zealand connects into the global security environment and the steps that some adversaries may take to undermine democracy and security. In that report, the NZSIS Director-General of Security Andrew Hampton, is quoted emphasizing the role transparency plays when trying to counter national security threats, “Being more open about national security means that as a country we can develop a greater understanding and be better placed to manage risks.” Additionally, the report highlighted how it was important for society to be conscious about bias and to avoid racially profiling and culturally stereotyping individuals given how foreign interference can have a specific cultural and ethnic component to it.
New Zealand has legislation that regulates the use of their citizen’s personal information by tech businesses including those involved with artificial intelligence, but it does not have any legislation in place that is specific to artificial intelligence. New Zealand also has a protocol system in place to for elected officials to be able vet for potential foreign interference, from proposed investments to campaign donations, with specific security teams that work on vetting any suspected threats.
From an Australian point of view.
Australia has proven to be one of the more successful nations in countering foreign interference, recently carrying out one of the largest disruptions of covert and overt activities by adversaries. What likely made those efforts possible can be understood through statistics like how Australia’s public safety stakeholders delivered security briefings to over 500 ministerial staff in Australian Parliament during the 2022-2023 year. Then how government stakeholders annually grade the success of Australia’s public safety stakeholders, with those grades being made publicly available on the government’s website. There is also how Australia’s case officers who end up working on highly sensitive matters are afforded a formal pathway to raise ethical concerns and express discomfort without career repercussions. All the success traces back to Australian legislators deciding to bring about legislative amendments to account for laws that were outdated and lacking in function.
In 2018, Australia decided to amend The National Security Legislation Amendment Act to amend and expanded its Criminal Code Act 1995, criminalising covert and deceptive or threatening activities by persons intending to interfere with Australia’s democratic system and processes, or to support the intelligence activities of a foreign government. The big change expanded what constituted as “espionage” and “foreign interference”, including 1) covert and deceptive or threatening activities by persons intending to interfere with Australia’s democratic systems and processes, 2) supporting the intelligence activities of a foreign government. More specifically, for the act of foreign interference to be a crime under the Criminal Code Act, the foreign interference must be linked to a foreign government or its proxy.
In 2020, Australia created the Commonwealth Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce to lead operational responses to foreign interference and works to identify, investigate and disrupt acts of foreign interference. The Taskforce brings together a multi-agency team that includes the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) officers, Australian Federal Police investigators and representatives of other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Since its inception, the Taskforce has conducted more than 120 operations to mitigate threats against different communities, political systems and classified information.
Australia’s Transparency Portal is an open government initiative that provides public access to data, information, and reports related to financial performance and operations of Australian government departments and agencies. These can range from annual reports, budgetary outcomes, performance statements, and other key financial documents. The portal centralizes all the information from the various branches of government, with an easy-to-navigate interface, and makes it possible to access multiple reports from a single source. Although Australia is not the first country to adopt a transparency portal, it is a leader in making public sector performance data accessible in a centralized and simplified format.
One document of significance that is available over Australia’s Transparency Portal is ASIO’s Annual Report 2022-2023, and its “Counter-espionage and foreign interference” section highlights how ASIO’s stakeholders, including policy makers, graded its performance. 95% of those stakeholders considered ASIO’s advice, at the least, to provide context that was relevant and practical, as influencing decision-making at the highest levels of government. 64% of those stakeholders went even further, stating that the advice provided had an even greater impact.
“Prohibition”-styled thinking and is vulnerable to hostile actors.
Canada’s economic and security partners are similar in how they approach foreign interference, and everyone is aligned in their efforts on countering it. Where the differences lay, between Canada and its closes partners, are rooted in government traditions and the transparency of government, and “prohibition”-styled thinking. Some countries see their federal government remain in office until the new government convenes, which results in elected officials still acting in an executive capacity. Some countries publish grades on the success of their ministry, graded by government stakeholders, and what is and is not working. Some countries were quicker to address “prohibition”-styled thinking that outlawed online sports betting and ensure that when links between certain sectors and crime are identified that they are quickly remedied.
For instance, Canada’s Ministers will “transfer” power over to Deputy Ministers (non-elected public officials) during the election (writ) period. Both Members of Parliament and political party heads have given testimonies at the Foreign Interference Commission about how briefings and interactions related to foreign interference were not effective, and Canada lacks grading schematics and metrics to be able to account for shortcomings. Canada was also slow to regulate online sports betting, which is one of the primary ways that elected officials and other public officials with institutional powers were exploited by hostile state actors, because of the legislative grey area that only prohibited gambling not at an establishment owned or licensed by a provincial government.
None of Canada’s economic and security partners seem to have platformed the idea that national security investigations should no longer set criminal prosecutions as the “gold standard” and as a measure of success, as was suggested in the Special Report on Federal Policing. Nor did they seem to lack the oversight bodies and whistle-blower protections to the degree that Canada does. Part 3 of this series will take a closer look at the implication of such absences and the difference they can make, to counter foreign interference efforts but also to promote public trust in democratic institutions.
A special thank you to Germany’s Federal Foreign Office, the U.K.’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, New Zealand’s Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Australia’s Department of Home Affairs for their contributions and making this article possible