Parts 1 and 2 of “Foreign Interference Around the World” looked at what Canada’s closest economic and security partners are doing to combat foreign interference and what was working where. These partners, along with Canada, largely aligned in how they approached issues related to countering foreign interference, but there were differences. Out of the bunch, Australia stood out most with the creation of a channel for those working on the country’s most important national security investigations to turn to with any concerns they may have. More importantly, they could raise their concerns with an oversight board and without having to fear any implications upon on their career.
One of the lesser explored angles related to foreign interference in Canada is that there is a total absence of Australian-like pathways for individuals to raise concerns related to national security matters when dealing with foreign interference, domestic interference, or organized crime. Despite that there was the potential to build up toward such policies, what should have been a mandatory review of the Public Servants Disclosure Protections Act (PSDPA) in 2012 was put on hold, and was then further complicated with a new government being voted into power. When the PSDPA did get reviewed in 2017, the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates (OGGO), which was responsible for conducting such reviews, put out a unanimous report that recommended more than 20 amendments, including greater protections for individuals who report wrongdoing. However, not all of the suggested amendments were introduced in the updated bill, including ensuring greater protections for whistleblowing.
Subsequent studies that were conducted in the following years showed that flawed legislation, dysfunctional organizational and political cultures created an environment that was hostile against anyone reporting any wrongdoing. Additionally, the studies highlighted how these issues were not limited exclusively to the federal level of government and that lower levels of government (provincial and municipal) were also plagued by same problem. Instead of ensuring that the frontlines were protected for acting as early warning systems for things like fraud, corruption, regulatory failings and wrongdoing, loyalty in the form of silence was demanded and failure to do so would result in reprisals. One of those studies even ranked Canada as having the world’s weakest whistleblower protection laws and tied with the likes Lebanon, while Australia, the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive and the US were ranked as strongest protection laws.
In April of 2023, the Whistleblowing Canada Research Society submitted a brief to the OGGO regarding the study of Bill C290, an Act to amend the PSDPA, which referenced some lesser-known national security failings. One example cited in the submission referenced the 1990s and how an RCMP officer who reported that he observed his computer being hacked while looking at it faced significant reprisals. That RCMP officer’s report resulted in Project Sidewinder, which discovered a litany of issues, including bribery, forgery of visas, drug and human trafficking, and other related crimes. A second example cited a CSIS bureau chief who testified at a House Committee about how every federal government over the past 30 years had been infiltrated, and that many believed there would have been warning signs long before the RCMP officer had reported the incident, but they were ignored.
Many of the details related to Bill C-290 have yet to be finalized, but international lists of best practices do exist. Some of those practices include making employers legally liable for neglecting to act on wrongdoing, creating a reverse onus requirement where managers must prove their actions were not reprisals, and accounting for any financial implications that a person may face for whistleblowing. Whether such protections get included in Bill C-290 remains to be seen, but there might not be a better way to insulate democratic institutions than to protect them from within.
Preserving undercover operations and protecting criminal informants.
A retired CBSA officer, who has held Canada’s highest security clearance and worked on matters related to national security, including working with Canada’s international security partners, has provided testimony on his experience with high-level investigations and how he was targeted by individuals involved in organized crime. That sequence of events was recently revisited on Sam Cooper’s The Bureau podcast, and how transnational crime groups and bad actors have seemingly been able to influence different sectors across Canada.
One of the incidents that was mentioned related to intelligence that had been shared by one of Canada’s security partners about the usage of fake travel documents by high-ranking organized crime figures. The information was supposed to be input into a secure database related to international travel. But the list was destroyed and the shared information never got into the database. There was mention of a second incident related to foreign travel documents that were stolen, had been recovered, and were supposed to be returned to the appropriate diplomatic missions, but some of those documents ended up getting destroyed. As a result of these incidents, the identities and information related to several high-profile individuals was lost, including individuals who had outstanding deportation orders and other who were involved in organized criminal activities.
Another incident mentioned stemmed from the CBSA officer having to testify against an individual who had transnational ties to organized groups and more, they were approached by different individuals to not do so. Eventually random individuals who were believed to be involved in organized criminal activity began to show up to their home and even followed them to other places. At work, there would be instances of workplace targeting and sabotage, which a manager admitted to doing, in an environment where no mistakes were tolerable. Even the smallest of typo mistakes could impact Canada’s border security officers from being able to protect our borders, but it also had the potential to impact international security stakeholders including Interpol.
Everything that the retired CBSA officer testified about paints a picture of dysfunction at the highest levels of federal policing and public safety. A place where preserving high-level investigations and criminal informants is of utmost importance. It also includes details about how Canada’s elected officeholders would prefer to avoid getting involved in messy situations, with some asking that the activities first get reported by the media before they would be comfortable addressing them. But should our society tolerate situations where undercover operations and criminal informants take priority over non-criminal Canadians?
Requesting a copy of the RCMP’s “Human Source Handling Program” report from NSIRA.
Many current and former government officials and security experts have been cited noting all the stories that are coming out about foreign interference, domestic interference, and organized crime are just the “tip of the iceberg”. Some of those same voices have also suggested that the government has a longstanding track record of struggling to ensure the flow of critical communication, as only a handful of individuals determine what information makes it to federal policy makers. Others have even referred to government as having a “secrecy culture” and struggling with “corruption”. Some of it might explain why policy makers have struggled to account for challenges they are not aware of, but none of it accounts for the different dynamics of national security investigations.
Instead of those suggestions, however, I believe many of the described problems could be explained by better understanding high-level operational procedures, fallout from failing to contain harms related to high-level investigations, and individuals embracing a “coverup culture” to not get fired. The core of the issue stems from the need to preserve undercover operations and criminal informants, sometimes by any means necessary, with any acknowledgement of failings resulting in having to reopen a countless number of cases and and cause major embarrassment to our institutions. In any case, our society should not tolerate situations where undercover operations and criminal informants take priority over non-criminal Canadians.
Attempting to find out why the that may be the case requires understanding how federal police and public safety stakeholders develop and maintain professional relationships with confidential informants, and what the associated safety and security considerations related to managing confidential informants might look like. With the Foreign Interference Commission having referenced the RCMP’s “Human Source Handling Program” during Stage 2 of the proceedings, a report provided to NSIRA, I have requested a copy of that report. Once it arrives, if it is not completely redacted, I am hoping it will provide a glimpse into a world rarely seen.