The Foreign Interference Commission’s call for public feedback on the issue of foreign interference (FI) from this past summer resulted in more than 200 written submissions, 624 questionnaire responses, and consultation meetings held with 105 individual members of diaspora communities. A 39-page report detailing those submissions was recently released by The Commission, covering a variety of different themes that were raised by the public. Those themes included questioning the existence and extent of foreign interference, detecting foreign interference, engaging with members of the Canadian public, and resources and supports for targeted individuals and communities. Moreover, it included FI specifics that were highlighted during Stage 1 and Stage 2 and the Policy Phase relating to immigration, legislation, threats and harassment; electoral, democratic, and diplomatic processes; and misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda.
After going over the entire report, however, what came as a shock was how there was not a single use of the word “crime” or any reference to organized crime. Why is that a big deal? Because Canada’s top officials, including elected officials, policing and public safety leaders, academics, industry practitioners, and other key stakeholders all acknowledged that organized crime was a critical factor in how hostile states conducted FI in their attempts to undermine our democracy. Without organized criminal elements, hostile states would almost certainly be relegated to carrying out FI over digital platforms. But by leaving out any mention of crime, the Public Consultation Report undermined key takeaways from Stage 1, Stage 2 and the Policy Phase of the Foreign Interference Commission, which all established organized crime as being a key factor in FI.
Having been accredited with the Foreign Interference Commission, I reached out to The Commission for comment on the absence of the word “crime” or any reference to organized crime, and why there is no mention of the role that organized crime plays, and whether that meant that there was no mention of it in public submissions. The initial response from The Commission was that it was unlikely that they would provide a comment on those matters, later responding by saying that the report summarized themes raised and discussed in the written submissions and questionnaire responses. Yet, The Commission’s decision to leave out any mention of the criminal components of FI undermines what has otherwise been a stellar display of the potential of public inquiries has otherwise been.
Seeing how I also submitted an 8-page submission—one providing specific details about how individuals who were providing access to illegal gambling services had succeeded (deceived) in getting a popular Member of Parliament (who won’t be named) to speak (during a previous election) at an event that was organized at their establishment, and having made a campaign donation the day before the event—this absence made no sense.
What makes the incident that I referenced more troubling is the fact that public safety and policing stakeholders were aware of what would transpire, but they chose not to notify that elected official. The fallout from that series of events and my reporting on the Foreign Interference Commission is that I have since received specific praises from individuals in the policing and public safety ecosystem and even “follows” over social platforms from Members of Parliament who are active on national security matters. Whether The Commission decides to disregard the crime intersection of FI in their final report remains to be seen.
In the meantime, however, it is worth looking at two major precedents that are likely to be set related to the time it takes to conduct a public inquiry and the phasing out of “policy phases” from future inquiries, and revisiting some key moments from the Foreign Interference Commission that were underreported on.
A New Precedent for Public Inquiry Timeframes
Over the past few decades, public inquiries dealing with major issues have often taken between three to seven years and would often address systemic or historical matters that were thought to require extensive research, hearings and public consultations. Those timeframes have always been determined by governments, who are responsible for setting the “terms of reference”. For example, the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada took 4 years (1993-1997), the Commission of Inquiry on the Air India Bombing lasted 4 years (2006-2010), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission took 7 years (2008-2015), and the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls took 3 years (2016-2019).
One of the major impacts of the Foreign Interference Commission, outside of its mandate, relates to the precedent that will get set about how a public inquiry into a major issue can be conducted in around a year’s time. Completing a public inquiry on a major issue like national security matters in around a year’s time, this commission should permanently change how democratic governments around the world think about public inquiries. As a result, the multi-year approach to doing public inquiries may be on its way out, but speedy inquiries into major issues also have the potential to rebuild trust in government and democratic institutions.
Policy Phases Phased Out?
How the Policy Phase of the Foreign Interference Commission unfolded, with academics and industry practitioners speaking without restraint about Canada’s national security shortfalls, all of it undermined and even questioned the veracity of previous testimonies that were offered up by Canada’s top officials (current and former). What made the testimonies during the Policy Phases so shocking was that they were being made by top diplomats, former RCMP Commissioners and CSIS directors. Aacademics and industry practitioners practically countered what Canada’s top officials had been testifying about in stages one and two, and also challenged the Commission’s understanding of FI.
Nobody may have imagined that they would hear some of Canada’s most accomplished and recognizable security experts make admissions like how policing stakeholders often decided against pursuing criminal investigations related to high-level organized crime or how CSIS warrants were incapable of meeting the high legal standard required for intelligence to be used in criminal prosecutions. Or would hear things like how FI was not at the root of all the erosion of trust in political parties and institutions, but that it was the result of individuals and institutional scandals over the decades and how Canada was involved in FI and never critical of FI activities when conducted by friendly states. The Commission also heard things like how a new “gold standard” that moved away from aggressive criminal prosecutions would further erode trust in policing and undermine Canada’s sovereignty.
Despite that the Policy Phase panels provided more detail and greater insight into the threat posed by FI and its different intersections than Stage 1 and Stage 2 combined, it was likely more than what was bargained for. Even though the different panels greatly improved the quality of the Foreign Interference Commission, having such academics and industry practitioners speaking without any restraints can be unfavorable for governments and institutions—especially when elections are at stake. As such, I believe future inquiries regarding major issues may see “policy phases” conducted separately from public hearings because of how much was learned about FI from the Policy Phase, and how it undermined and even questioned the veracity of previous testimonies offered up by Canada’s top officials.
Underreported Moments
Being the only person covering the Foreign Interference Commission from an academic perspective and exploring relevant public policy intersections related to foreign interference, I felt there were some key moments that seem to have been underreported on. Here are three of those moments.
First, some parties submitted key documents in the early morning hours and only hours before being set to testify, undermining the scheduled proceedings and complicating the question-asking process. Thankfully, Commissioner Hogue routinely provided lawyers with time extensions to ask final follow up questions, which is not the norm when it comes to public inquiries but allowed for greater takeaways.
Second, The Commission seemed to decide against having diaspora community leaders from across Canada provide testimony under oath. Having testimony offered on something as serious as FI that is not tied to any oath undermined those ethnic leaders and relegated their comments to mere hearsay. No clear answer as to why this decision was made has been provided.
Third, an observer waited for the end of day (during Stage 2) before standing up from his seat and staging a vocal protest by speaking directly to Justice Hogue, highlighting their experience as an Arab-Canadian being targeted by hostile state actors. The Commission’s security protection team was on top of the situation, but they did not intervene, and Justice Hogue addressed the individual directly regarding their comments. A surprisingly well-handled situation.
Organized Crime and the Final Report
Whether or not The Commission decides to disregard the crime intersection of FI in their final report remains to be seen, but it was the single item that had consensus among everyone who provided testimony about how FI works. The absence of the word “crime” or any reference to organized crime in the Public Consultation Report makes the contents of the final report less predictable. Either way, we will find out soon, as The Hogue Report will be published by January 31st, 2025.